Abstract. The references [9, 3, 1] treat timing attacks on RSA with CRT and Montgomery's multiplication algorithm in unprotected implementations. It has been widely believed that exponent blinding would prevent any timing attack on RSA. At cost of significantly more timing measurements this paper extends the before-mentioned attacks to RSA with CRT when Montgomery's multiplication algorithm and exponent blinding are applied. Simulation experiments are conducted, which confirm the theoretical results. Effective countermeasures exist. In particular, the attack efficiency is higher than in the previous version [12] while large parts of both papers coincide.
Introduction
In 1996 Paul Kocher introduced timing analysis [6] . In particular, [6] presents a timing attack on an unprotected RSA implementation, which does not apply the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Reference [9] introduced a new timing attack on RSA implementations, which apply CRT and Montgomery's multiplication algorithm [8] . This attack was extended to OpenSSL (RSA, CRT, sliding window exponentiation algorithm, Montgomery's multiplication algorithm) [3] , and later optimized [1] . Also [5, [9] [10] [11] consider timing attacks on RSA implementations that apply Montgomery's multiplication algorithm. All these attacks target unprotected RSA implementations.
Besides presenting the first timing attack on RSA (without CRT) [6] proposes various countermeasures (Section 10), including exponent blinding where a random multiple of Euler's φ function of the modulus is added to the secret exponent. Since then (exclusive) exponent blinding has widely been assumed to be effective to prevent (any type of) timing attacks on RSA, at least no successful timing attacks against exponent blinding have been known. The present paper extends the timing attack from [9] to RSA implementations, which apply exponent blinding, proving that exclusive exponent blinding (without additional countermeasures) does not always prevent timing attacks on RSA. However, the presence of exponent blinding increases the number of timing measurements enormously.
In Section 2 the targeted implementation is described (RSA with CRT, square & multiply, Montgomery's multiplication algorithm, exponent blinding), assumptions are formulated and justified. Section 3 contains the theoretical foundations of our attack while in Section 4 the attack is specified and experimental results are given. Moreover, the attack is adjusted to table-based exponentiation algorithms, and effective countermeasures are proposed.
In this paper the attack efficiency is higher than in [12] . For several proofs in Section 3 and an parameter estimation process we refer to [12] . Apart from that and from editorial improvements both papers essentially coincide in large parts.
Modular Exponentiation with Montgomery's Multiplication Algorithm
In this section we describe the targeted RSA implementation. More precisely, we begin with the modular arithmetic, and finally we specify the modular exponentiation algorithm. Moreover, two assumptions are formulated and analysed, which will be applied later. Montgomery's multiplication algorithm (MM) [8] fits perfectly to the hardware architecture of a computer, smart card or microcontroller since modulo operations and divisions only have to be carried out for moduli and divisors, which are powers of 2. For an odd modulus M the integer R := 2 t > M is called Montgomery's constant, and R −1 ∈ Z M denotes its multiplicative inverse modulo M . Moreover, M * ∈ Z R satisfies the integer equation RR −1 − M M * = 1. On input (a, b) Montgomery's algorithm returns MM(a, b; M ) := abR −1 ( mod M ). This value is computed with a multiprecision version of Montgomery's multiplication algorithm, which is adjusted to the particular device. More precisely, let ws denote the word size for the arithmetic operations (typically, ws = 8, 16, 32, 64), which divides the exponent t of R. Further, r = 2 ws , so that in particular R = r v with v = t/ws (numerical example: (ws, t, v) = (16, 1024, 64)). In Algorithm 1 a, b and s are expressed in the r-adic representation. That is, a = (
Step 4, called 'extra reduction' (ER), is carried out iff s ∈ [M, 2M ). This conditional integer subtraction is responsible for timing differences. Whether an ER is necessary does not depend on the chosen multiprecision variant but only on the quadruple (a, b, M, R) [9] , Remark 1. This allows to consider the case ws = t (i.e. v = 1) when analyzing the stochastic behaviour of the ERs in modular exponentiations.
Algorithm 2 combines Montgomery's multiplication algorithm with the square & multiply exponentiation algorithm.
Algorithm 2. Square & multiply with Montgomery's algorithm (s&m, MM)
As usual, n = p 1 p 2 and R denotes the Montgomery constant while MM(a, b; n) := abR −1 (mod n) stands for the Montgomery multiplication of a and b. The computation of v = y d (mod n) is performed in several steps: 
(b) (Exponent blinding) Generate a random number r 2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 eb − 1} and compute the blinded exponent d 2,b v 2 ), e.g. with Garner's algorithm: 
Theoretical Background of our Attack
This section contains the theoretical foundations of our attack. The main results are the mean value and the variance of the execution time of Algorithm 3 (Subsection 3.1 and Subsection 3.2) and the distinguisher, which allows to decide whether a given interval contains / does not contain a multiple of p 1 or p 2 .
(Subsection 3.3).
Exponentiation (mod p i )
In Subsection 3.1 we consider the stochastic timing behaviour of the exponentiations modulo p 1 and modulo p 2 . More precisely, we focus on the for-loop in Algorithm 2 when applied by Step i(c) of Algorithm 3 with M = p i for i = 1, 2. By
Step i(b) of Algorithm 3 the blinding factor r i is a randomly selected ebbit number, i.e. r i ∈ {0, . . . , 2 eb − 1} for i = 1, 2. We interpret the measured execution times as realizations of random variables. Definition 2. Random variables are denoted by capital letters, and realizations (i.e., values taken on) of these random variables are denoted with the corresponding small letter. The abbreviation 'iid' stands for 'independent and identically distributed'. For a random variable Y the terms E(Y ), E(Y 2 ) and Var(Y ) denote its expectation (mean), its second moment and its variance, respectively. The term Y ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ) means that the random variable N is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ 2 . The cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribution N (0, 1) is given by Φ(x) := (2π)
The distinguisher and the attack in Section 4 consider input values of the form y = uR −1 (mod n). A simple calculation shows that the pre-multiplication step in Algorithm 2 transforms the input value y into y R,i := u( mod p i ) ( [9] , Sect. 3, after formula (5)). Consequently, we interpret the execution time of the for-loop in Algorithm 2 as a realization of a random variable Z i (u). With this notation
expresses the random computation time for the exponentiation ( mod p i ) in terms of the random variables Q i , M i and X i . The random variables Q i and M i denote the random number of squarings and multiplications within the for loop in
Step i(c) while X i quantifies the number of extra reductions (ERs) in these squarings and multiplications (i = 1, 2). Unfortunately, the random variables Q i , M i and X i are not independent. The main goal of this subsection is to calculate E(Z i (u)) and Var(Z i (u)). By definition
Clearly, x r ∈ {0, . . . , q j + m k }, m k ∈ {0, . . . , q j } and q j ∈ {k − 1, . . . , k + eb − 1}. Lemma 1 collects several facts, which will be needed in the following. Recall that p i < R.
Lemma 1. As in Section 2 the term y i stands for y(mod p i ).
(i) For y := uR −1 (mod n) the MM-transformed basis for the exponentiation (mod p i ) equals u i := u(mod p i ). 
The random variable
Proof. see [12] , proof of Lemma 1.
Theorem 1. Combining the previous results we obtain
and
Proof. see [12] , proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2 provides explicit expressions for E(Q i ) and Var(Q i ), which may be substituted into (8) and (9) . Note that
Lemma 2. Let p i be a k-bit number, and let
(ii) In particular, E(Q i ) is monotonously increasing in γ i and assumes values in
The maximum value 2.25 is taken on for
Proof. see [12] , proof of Lemma 2. (8), (9), (10) and (11) for exemplary parameter sets. 
Further Arithmetic Operations and Noise
The random variables Z 1 (u) and Z 2 (u) quantify the random timing behaviour of the for-loop in Algorithm 2 when called in Step 1(c) and
Step 2(c) of Algorithm 3, respectively. However, the computation of (uR −1 (mod n)) d (mod n) requires several further steps:
Step 1(a) and Step 2(a) (reduction modulo p i ),
Step 1(b) and Step 2(b) (exponent blinding), Step 1(c) and Step 2(c) (here: pre-multiplication and post-multiplication of Algorithm 2), Step 3 (recombination), time for input and output etc. In analogy to Subsection 3.1 we view the required overall execution time for these before-mentioned steps as a realization of a random variable Z 3 (u).
It seems reasonable to assume that the time for input and output of data, for recombination and blinding as well as the reduction (mod p i ) in Step 1(a) and Step 2(a) of Algorithm 3 do not (or at most weakly) depend on u. The postprocessing step in Algorithm 2 never needs an ER. (By [13] , Theorem 1, in Algorithm 1, after Step 3 we have s ≤ M + temp · r −v < M + 1, and thus s ≤ M . If s = M then temp = 0 after the extra reduction, which can only happen if u is a multiple of M = p i but then y R ≡ uR −1 R ≡ 0 mod p i , and Algorithm 2 does not need any extra reduction at all.) In the pre-multiplication in Algorithm 2 an ER may occur or not. Altogether, we may assume
for all u ∈ Z n and (12)
Assumption 3. In the following we assume E(Z 3 (u)) =z 3 for all u and interpret the centered random variable Z 3 (u) −z 3 as part of the noise, which is captured by the random variable N e . If Var(N e ) = σ 
Remark 4. [Justification of Assumption 3]
The part of Assumption 3, which concerns Z(u), follows from the preceding arguments. Measurement errors are usually assumed to be Gaussian distributed, and if the noise comprises of several contributions (of comparable size) the Central Limit Theorem may be used as an additional argument for the assumption of Gaussian noise. However, the core of our attack is a distinguisher, which separates two probability distributions with different mean values. As long as the noise is assumed to be data-independent the distinguisher should work for arbitrary noise distributions (maybe the number of timing measurements varies).
The Distinguisher
Now we derive a distinguisher, which will be the core of our attack (to be developed in Section 4). With regard to the preceding the overall random execution time for input u is described by the random variable
In the following we assume
Theorem 1 implies
As in [9] we distinguish between three cases: Case A: The interval {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 } does not contain a multiple of p 1 or p 2 . 
Further,
where x denotes the smallest integer ≥ x. At the beginning of our attack we have no concrete information on the size of the primes p 1 and p 2 , and thus we use the rough approximation
With approximation (19) formula (18) simplifies to
, and similarly (20)
since k i = log 2 (p i ) = log 2 (R) then. Finally (17) and (20) imply
In the following we focus on the case √ 0.5 < β < 1, which is the most relevant case since then 0.5R 2 < n < R 2 , i.e. n is a 2 log 2 (R) bit modulus and, consequently, p 1 and p 2 are log 2 (R)-bit numbers. We point out that the case β < √ 0.5 can be treated analogously. In (20) and (21) 
log 2 (pi) −log 2 (R) . However, the 'correction factor' may not be unambiguous, which might lead to some inaccuracy in the formulae, finally implying a slight loss of attack efficiency.
From (14) we obtain
For given R, eb, c, c ER , u the variance Var(Z i (u)) is nearly independent of p i /R and increases somewhat when the ratio u/p i increases (see Table 1 ). Since the true values p 1 /R and p 2 /R are unknown during the attack we approximate (23) by
Here 'var β;max ' suggestively stands for the term (9) with βR in place of p i and u , i.e. we replace the probabilities p i * and p i(u ) by β/3 and β/2, respectively. We point out that variance (23) has no direct influence on the decision strategy of our attack but determines the required sample size. Usually, (24) should overestimate (23) somewhat. Moreover, decision errors can be detected and corrected (cf. Section 4, 'confirmed intervals'). So we should be on the safe side anyway. For fixed p i the mean E(Z i (u)) increases monotonically in u/p i (see (8)). In fact, our attack exploits these differences. On basis of execution times for input values (bases) y = u i R −1 (mod n) (i = 1, 2) the attacker has to decide for hundreds of intervals {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 } whether they contain p 1 or p 2 . By (22) the value
is a natural decision boundary. In fact, for given u 1 < u 2 and y i := (u i R −1 ( mod n) this suggests the following decision rule:
, and for (Case B or Case C) else.
(Note that we do not need to distinguish between Case B and Case C.) Here Time(y d i ( mod n)) denotes the execution time for input value y i , which of course depends on the blinding factors for the modular exponentiation (mod p 1 ) and (mod p 2 ). However, since the variance Var(Z(u 2 ) − Z(u 1 )) is too large for reliable decisions we consider N iid random variables Z [1] (u), . . . , Z [N ] (u) in place of Z(u), which are distributed as Z(u) (corresponding to N exponentiations with input value y = uR −1 (mod n)). Unlike for decision strategy (26) we evaluate the average timing difference from N pairs of timing measurements (see Sect. 4). For N τ the inequality
Applying the above decision strategy (26) to N ≥ N τ pairs of timing differences the Central Limit Theorem then implies Table 2 . Exemplary sample sizes Nτ for several parameter sets for σ 2 N = 0 (no noise). Note that Φ(−2.5) = 0.0062 and Φ(−2.7) = 0.0035. Larger τ reduces the error probability for each decision but increases the sample size Nτ . Table 2 evaluates (27) for several parameter sets with σ At the end of Phase 1 our attack algorithm from Section 4 has found u 1 and u 2 with p i ∈ {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 } for i = 1 or i = 2. Thus in Phase 2 we may replace β by the more precise estimate β (2) := (u 1 +u 2 )/(2R), which may be substituted into the formulae (20) to (27). In particular, we obtain a new decision boundary
which should be 'better' centered between the mean values E(Z(u 2 ) − E(u 1 )) for Case A and for Case B than decbound.
The Attack
In this section we describe and analyse the attack algorithm. Two improvements increase its efficiency compared to [12] . We provide experimental results and adjust our attack to table-based exponentiation algorithms. Effective countermeasures are proposed. Amazingly, the attack algorithm and its underlying ideas are rather similar to the attack on unprotected implementations.
The Attack Algorithm
To simplify notation we introduce the abbreviation
That is, MeanTime(u, N) denotes the average time of N modular exponentiations y d (mod n) with basis y = uR −1 (mod n). The sample size N is selected with regard to the results from Subsection 3.3. In our simulation experiments we used N 2.5 . The attack falls into three phases. The goal of Phase 1 is to find an interval {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 }, which contains p 1 or p 2 . In Phase 2 this interval is successively bisected into two halves where that halve is maintained, which is assumed to contain p i . Phase 2 ends when the attacker knows the upper half plus few bits of the binary representation of p i , and in Phase 3 the prime p i is computed with Coppersmith's algorithm, which transfers the search for p i into a lattice problem [4] . With regard to Phase 3 one should take care that in Phase 1 and Phase 2 indeed p 1 or p 2 are targeted and not just an integer multiple thereof. If the most relevant case where p i > 0.5R (definitely fulfilled if β = √ n/R > √ 0.5) the interval [βR, R] contains p 1 or p 2 but no multiple. The following attack may require a pre-step in which the timing parameters c and c ER are estimated (see Remark 1).
The Attack.
Phase 1
Select an integer u somewhat smaller than βR, set (e.g.) ∆ := 2
Apply Coppersmiths algorithm to determine p i * The attacker believes that Case A is correct ** The attacker believes that Case B or Case C is correct After Phase 2 the upper ≈ 0.5 log 2 (p i ) + 10 bits of u 1 and u 2 coincide, which yields ≈ 0.5 log 2 (p i ) + 10 bits of p i . That is, p i = p i + x 0 with known p i and unknown x 0 and log 2 (x 0 ) ≈ 0.5 log 2 (R) − 10. The division n/ p i yields an analogous decomposition p 3−i = p 3−i + y 0 . Altogether, we obtain a bivariate polynomial equation
for which (x 0 , y 0 ) is a 'small' solution. Reference [4] transfers the problem into a shortest vector problem, which can be solved with the LLL algorithm. This requires that log 2 (x 0 ), log 2 (y 0 ) < 0.25 log 2 (n). In Phase 2 we determine ≈ 10 bits more than the upper halve of the bits of p i to speed up the execution time of the LLL algorithm. We did not solve the lattice problem in our experiments. We counted an attack successful if after Phase 2 p 1 or p 2 was contained in the final interval {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 }. Of course, if after the end of Phase 2 {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 } does not contain p 1 or p 2 in Phase 3 the modulus n cannot be factored and thus the attack fails. This means that all decisions until the end of Phase 2 must be correct. For 1024 bit primes, for instance, the algorithm requires about 550 individual decisions. Fortunately, it is very easy to check whether an intermediate interval {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 } indeed contains a prime (cf. [9] , Sect. 5).
Confirmed intervals (i) Assume that after Phase 1 or during Phase 2 the attack algorithm has determined an interval {u 1 +1, . . . , u 2 }. To check whether this interval indeed contains p 1 or p 2 one may perform 2N new timing measurements, compute MeanTime(u 2 , N)−MeanTime(u 1 , N) and apply the above decision rule. If the time difference is < decbound II we are convinced that {u 1 +1, . . . , u 2 } contains p 1 or p 2 , and we call {u 1 +1, . . . , u 2 } a 'confimed interval'. If not, we repeat the test with 2N new timing measurements: in case of '< decbound II ' we believe that the first test result has been false, and {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 } is the new confirmed interval. If again '> decbound II ' we believe that an earlier decision was wrong and restart the attack at the preceding confirmed interval. Confirmed intervals should be established after con decisions. The value con should be selected with regard to the probability for a wrong individual decision. The first confirmed interval should be established at the end of Phase 1.
(ii) Of course, an erroneously confirmed interval will let the attack fail. This probability can be reduced e.g. by applying a 'majority of three' decision rule where the 'original' interval {u 1 + 1, . . . , u 2 } (determined by our attack algorithm) unlike in (i) does not count. Alternatively, the algorithm might jump back to the last but one confirmed interval if the preceding confirmed interval turns out to be wrong with high probability.
Improvements compared to [12] Compared to [12] the attack algorithm features two improvements: First of all, it aims at the larger prime, which increases the difference E(Z(u 2 )) − E ( Z(u 1 ) for Case B and Case C, and in Phase 2 it applies the readjusted decision boundary (29) in place of (25). A comparision between the simulation results in Table 3 with those in Table 3 in [12] shows that these improvements reduce the average number of timing measurements significantly. Additional options to further increase the attack efficiency might be to optimize the selection of con in dependence of τ and to apply sequential analysis as in [1] .
Remark 5.
[Scaling] We assume eb log 2 (R) (typical case). (i) By (25), (29) and (9) doubling the length of the prime factors p 1 and p 2 roughly doubles decbound, decbound II and var β;max . If σ 2 N ≈ 0 by (27) N τ decreases to approximately 50%. On the other hand, the attack needs about twice as many individual decisions. This points to the surprising fact that the overall number of timing measurements per attack is to a large extent independent of the modulus length if σ 2 N ≈ 0.
(ii) Similarly, halving c ER halves decbound and decbound II but leaves var β;max nearly unchanged. If σ 2 N ≈ 0 by (27) the attack then requires about 4 times as many timing measurements. The decision boundaries depend linearly on c ER (25). For realistic ratios c ER /c in (9) the E(Q i )(. . .)-term, and within the bracket the first summand dominates. Consequently, (27) implies that the number of timing measurements increases roughly like (c ER /c) −2 .
Remark 6. As its predecessors in [9, 3, 1] our attack and its variants for tablebased exponentiation algorithms (Subsection 4.3) are adaptive chosen input attacks. We point out that our attack would also work for input values (u + x)R −1 (mod n) with |x| n 1/4 in place of the input values uR −1 (mod n). This property allows to meet possible minor restrictions on the input values (e.g. some set bits), which might be demanded by the targeted RSA application.
Experimental Results
In this subsection we present experimental results. As already mentioned in Section 2 it only depends on the quadruple (a, b, M, R) but not on any features of the implementation whether MM(a, b; M ) requires an extra reduction. This property allows to simulate the modular exponentiations y d (mod n) and to count the number of extra reductions, which finally corresponds to an attack under perfect timing measurements and with E(Z 3 (u)) =z 3 , Var(Z 3 (u)) = 0, i.e. Z 3 (u) ≡ z 3 for all 0 < u < n, which is an idealization of (12) and (13) . Consequently, also in the absence of noise in real-life experiments the number of timing measurements thus should be somewhat larger than for our simulation experiments. The impact of noise was quantified in Subsection 3.3.
In our experiments we selected the primes p 1 and p 2 pseudorandomly. The table entry p i /R = 0.75, for instance, means that p i has been selected pseudorandomly in the interval [0.75 − 0.025, 0.75 + 0.025]R. The secret exponent d was computed according to the public exponent e = 2 16 + 1. Table 3 provides experimental results for several sets of parameters. In our experiments we assumed σ 2 N = 0. We calculated N τ with formula (27) (in Phase 2 with decbound II ), which also allows to extrapolate the number of timing measurements for any noise level. Table 3 confirms the considerations from Remark 5. Several experiments with p 1 /R ≈ p 2 /R were conducted, which verify that the attack becomes the more efficient the larger these ratios are. The reason is that |decbound| and |decbound II | depend almost linearly on β while var β;max remains essentially unchanged. To save computation time many experiments were conducted for 512-bit primes and ratio c ER /c ≈ 0.05, which may seem to be relatively large for real-world applications. Remark 5 allows the extrapolation of the simulation results to smaller ratios c ER /c and to other modulus lengths.
The number of timing measurements, which are required for a successful attack, has non-negligible variance. The reason is that if an error has been detected the algorithm steps back to the preceding confirmed interval. We established confirmed intervals after the end of Phase 1, after the end of Phase 2 and regularly after con = 40 decisions. For fixed value con a larger τ increases the success rate of the attack but also the number of timing measurements per individual decision. 
Table-Based Exponentiation Algorithms
The timing attack against unprotected implementations can be adjusted to tablebased exponentiation algorithms [9, 3, 1] . This is also possible in case of exponent blinding.
We first consider the fixed-window exponentiation ( [7] , 14.82), which is combined with Montgomery's exponentiation algorithm. The window size is b > 1. In
Step i(c) of Algorithm 3 (exponentiation modulo p i ) for basis y = uR −1 ( mod p i ) the following precomputations are carried out:
The exponentiation modulo p i requires (2 b − 3) + (log 2 (R) + ebr)/(b2 b ) Montgomery multiplications by y 1,i in average (table initialization + exponentiation phase; the computation of y 2,i is actually a squaring operation). The attack tries to exploit these Montgomery multiplications modulo p 1 or p 2 , respectively. Compared to the s&m exponentiation algorithm the attack efficiency decreases significantly since the percentage of 'useful' operations (here: the multiplications by y 1 ) shrinks tremendously. The Montgomery multiplications by y 1,i are responsible for the mean timing difference between Case A and (Case B or Case C) . In analogy to (25) for √ 0.5 < β < 1 we conclude
The computation of Var b (Z i (u)) may be organized as in the s&m case. We do not carry out these lengthy calculations in the following but derive an approximation (34), which suffices for our purposes. We yet give some advice how to organize an exact calculation. First of all, the table initialisation modulo p i costs an additional squaring. In average, there are E(Q)/b2 b +2 b −3 multiplications by y i,1 (responsible for exploitable timing differences), E(Q)/b2 b multiplications by y i,0 (do not need extra reductions) and altogether (2 b − 2)E(Q)/b2 b multiplications by some y i,j with j > 1. When computing the second moment additionally to the s&m case the covarianc cov i,MM(u i ) (2 b − 4 times, table initialization) occur. The term cov i,MM(u i ) is defined and calculated analogously to cov i,SM(u i ) , cov i,MS(u i ) and cov i,SS .
To assess the efficiency of our timing attack on b-bit fixed window exponentiation we estimate the ratio of the variances Var b (Z i (u)) and Var(Z i (u)) (s&m case). Therefore, we simply count the number of Montgomery operations in both cases (neglecting the different ratios between squarings and multiplications). This gives the rough estimate
Finally, we obtain a pendant to (27)
with For b-bit sliding window exponentiation the table initialization the comprises the following operations:
In the exponentiation phase the exponent bits are scanned from the left to the right. In the following we derive an estimate for the number of multiplications by the table entries within an exponentiation (mod p i ). Assume that the last window either 'ended' at exponent bit 
exponent bits in average. This gives the pendant to (34): It is hardly possible to define a clear-cut lower bound for the number of timing measurements from which on the attack should be viewed impractical. The maximum number of available timing measurements clearly depends on the concrete attack scenario. Cryptographic software on PCs and servers usually applies a large table size b, and the timing measurements are often to some degree noisy. Example 1 shows that for large window size b and realistic ratios c ER /c the attack requires a gigantic number of timing measurements, all the more in the presence of non-negligible noise. Example 1 provides these numbers relative to the square & multiply case. The absolute numbers of timing measurements depend on the ratios c ER /c and p i /R and on the level of noise (cf. Remark 5(ii), Subsection 4.2 and Subsection 3.3).
Countermeasures
The most solid countermeasure is to avoid extra reductions entirely. In fact, one may resign on the extra reductions within modular exponentiation if R > 4p i ( [13] , Theorem 3 and Theorem 6). This solution (resigning on extra reductions) was selected for OpenSSL as response on the instruction cache attack described in [2] . We point out that the present attack could also be prevented by combining exponent blinding with base blinding ( [6] , Sect. 10), for example, which in particular would also prevent the attack from [2] . However, the first option is clearly preferable as it prevents any type of timing attack.
Conclusion
It has widely been assumed that exclusive exponent blinding would prevent timing attacks. This paper shows that this assumption is not generally true (although exponent blinding reduces the efficiency of our timing attack significantly). In the presence of little or moderate noise our attack is a practical threat against square & multiply exponentiation and should be considered (see also Remark 6). Our attack can also be applied to fixed window exponentiation and to sliding window exponentiation. However, for large window size b the attack requires a very large number of timing measurements. The attack may be practically infeasible then, in particular for small ratios c ER /c or in the presence of non-negligible noise. Fortunately, effective countermeasures exist.
